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Ⅰ．Introduction
Since the global financial crisis of 2008, China has been expanding its influence in the 
international financial community. Zhou Xiaochuan, the governor of the People’s Bank of China, 
drew attention with his mention of the possibility that IMF’s special disposal right (SDR) could be 
a new currency regime replacing the current dollar standard system (Zhow, 2009). In addition, in 
line with the rapid growth of the Chinese economy, the yuan distribution volume in neighboring 
states and regions has increased, and the yuan has become the reserve currency in some countries 
(Ohnishi, 2005). Currently attention is focused in particular on the trend of the internationalisation 
of the yuan in the international financial community.
On the other hand, Japan also acted proactively in the 2008 financial crisis, with moves such 
as 10 trillion yen in financial assistance for the IMF. However, Japan was criticised for its failure 
to provide a strong voice in the international financial community. In contrast to China, Japan 
appealed for the continuation of the dollar standard system, but did not gain much acceptance in 
the international financial community (Katada, 2009). Japan has been endeavoring to construct an 
international monetary cooperation system, and has provided leadership in economic assistance 
measures for the 1998 Asian currency crisis and in the construction of financial safety nets 
for Asian regions. Nevertheless, Japan had not exercised strong leadership in promoting the 
internationalisation of yen (Amyx, 2002).
Various economics and international relations studies have examined the issues of 
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internationalisation of the yen and internationalisation of the yuan.1） In economics, the 
internationalisation of the yen and the yuan has been the subject of policy debate. In general, 
economists have pointed out that the cause of the Asian currency crisis was the excessive 
pegging of Asian currencies to the US dollar, and have insisted on the necessity of Asian monetary 
cooperation and on the introduction of a common currency.  In that light, there has been an 
emphasis on the importance of the internationalisation of major currencies in Asia (Kwan, 2003: 
Murase, 2000). In addition, some experts have proposed a strategy for the creation of the Asian 
Currency Unit (ACU), a step to be taken subsequent to the internationalisation of the yen and the 
yuan (Ogawa and Ito, 2000). However, economists have not been able to provide an explanation for 
the failure of their proposed strategy of internationalising the yen and yuan to develop.
In international relations studies, one school of thought is that currency diplomacy can be 
also positioned on the projected line of reasoning underlying the view that Japanese diplomacy is 
‘reactive’ (Terada, 2010). Adherents to that view point out that Japan lacks political leadership not 
only in international finance but also in currency diplomacy (Amyx, 2002), and has been acting 
only to maintain its international influence at the same level as China, in light of Japan's awareness 
of China’s rapidly growing influence in international finance (Terada, 2010: 89). Some studies 
support this view, pointing to the level of pressure from Japanese politicians and domestic industry 
concerning the delay in the internationalisation of the yen (Imamatsu, 2000; Katada, 2010). 
Although international relations researchers point out the absence of Japan’s strategy and 
an increase in domestic pressure, they cannot provide a convincing mechanism of how such 
things occur. In international relations studies it is thought that Japan is an actor and its domestic 
economy is a black box (Shinoda, 2006). Analysis of domestic policymaking process is the domain 
of political science, but very few analyses consider the international finance and currency policies 
of International Bureau, Ministry of Finance (MOF) in Japan to be a political science research 
subject. Using a political science analytical approach, this paper undertakes an analysis of Japan's 
decision-making process for international finance and currency policies, until now regarded in 
international relations studies as a black box. The findings will be applied to an examination of 
the assertion by some international relations studies that Japan lacks strategy. In fact, Japan 
has constructed concrete international finance and currency policy strategy, mainly through 
International Bureau, MOF, but the political leadership to realize that strategy has been lacking.
This paper pursues the cause of this political leadership vacuum, focusing not on the capacity 
of politicians but on a comparison with China, to reveal that the true cause is a structural problem 
in Japan’s policy making process.
The structure of this paper is as follows. First, core executive theory is used to lay out the 
paper’s analytical framework. Then, the core executive structure of the policymaking process 
in Japan and China is clarified, and the two countries' processes are compared. A case study 
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compares past processes of the internationalisation of free currency in Japan and China, using 
the paper’s analytical framework. The paper’s claim is as follows. In China, thanks to the top-
down decision-making of the Communist Party and the State Council, the leader can easily display 
political leadership in the international financial community. In Japan, on the other hand, due 
to the bottom-up decision making structure in MOF, the Cabinet does not have the substantive 
right to decide. In addition, in that structure the Cabinet easily feels pressure from political tribes 
(zoku-giin) and the business world. As a result, Japan is unable to display political leadership in 
the international financial community.
Ⅱ．Analytical Framework: Core Executive Theory
This paper presents a comparison of the international finance and currency policymaking 
processes of Japan and in China, using the concept of the ‘core executive' (Rhodes and Dunleavy, 
1995; Rhodes, 1995) which is currently drawing attention in policymaking process studies in Japan 
and overseas. ‘Core executive’ consists of central figures such as the Prime Minister, the Cabinet, 
the Cabinet Committee and high-level bureaucrats, i.e. those who eventually manage conflicts 
among organs within the central government. This is a model for the analysis of the informal 
meetings of those people; current systems and networks for negotiations among ministries and 
agencies; and the salient interdependences in customary practice (Rhodes, 1995). This model 
has been attracting heightened attention globally and it is thought to be applicable to Japan’s 
policymaking system (Ito, 2006).
In comparative politics studies, there has been almost no attempt to compare the political 
institutions of Japan and China. The reason for this lay in the differences between the political 
regimes: China is a communist regime while Japan is a democratic regime. Basically, Japan has been 
the subject of comparative studies with western democratic countries in terms of the parliamentary 
cabinet system, universal suffrage system, cabinet system, and bureaucracy (Silberman, 1993). 
Still, it can be pointed out that the political systems of Japan and China have some 
similarities. For example, both countries were governed for a long time by one-party rule: the 
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in Japan and the Communist party in China. Although in Japan, 
the government changed in 2009 and one-party dominant system has ended, its political and 
administrative systems, which were constructed under the long-term rein, have many points in 
common with those of China. Concretely, the political and administrative systems have a dual 
existence, in party organisation and government organisation. In western democratic countries, 
on the other hand, policymaking is unified in the cabinet. Many western countries adopted the 
parliamentary system and there the majority party in the parliament (the ruling party) organises 
the Cabinet. Therefore, members of the ruling party participate in the Cabinet but the party does 
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not independently formulate policy (Onishi, 2005: 2-37).
Exceptional among the democratic countries which have adopted the parliamentary system, 
Japan has the ruling party taking dualistic part, along with the Cabinet, in policy-making. It is 
mainly socialist countries, such as China with its established one-party rule, which have such an 
organisational structure. In the case of Japan, since the rein of LDP and coalition governments 
centred around LDP has continued for such a long time (with 11 months' exception in the period 
from 1955 and 2009), the political and administrative rules were established on the basis of the 
one-party rule principle. However, one profound difference between Japan and China is that the 
Communist party has the final word and ‘the government’s leadership by the Communist party’ is 
clearly specified in the constitution, while in Japan the Cabinet has the final decision making rights 
(Murakawa, 2000).
Ⅱ.1. Core Executive in China
This chapter presents a classification of the core executive engaged in policymaking in China 
(Onishi, 2004 and other). 
The Communist Party has the final word on Chinese policy decisions. The Communist Party 
Central Committee makes decision directly about matters such as diplomacy, economic policy, 
ethnic minorities and disasters. It also has final decision-making authority over the execution 
of policy. Various actors play important roles in policymaking in the Communist Party; the top 
decision makers within the Party are the nine major politburo standing committee members. 
There is a hierarchy among those members: the top person is Hu Jintao, General Secretary of 
the Communist Party, President of the People’s Republic of China, and Chairman of the Central 
Military Commission. Second in the power hierarchy is Wu Bangguo, Chairman of the Standing 
Committee of the National People’s Congress; third is Wen Jiabao, Premier and Party Secretary of 
the State Council of the People’s Republic of China. Under the nine major members there are 24 
politburo members including the politburo standing committee members mentioned above. Under 
the politburo standing committee members are 198 Central Committee members (including the 
above 24), followed by 158 candidates for Central Committee membership. The person in charge 
of international monetary and currency policy is number six, Huang Ju, Executive Vice Premier of 
the People’s Republic of China. International monetary and currency policy are considered to be 
among the most important sectors of policy, and final decisions in those sectors are made directly 
by Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao (Onishi, 2004: 2-8)
The State Council, equivalent to Japan’s Cabinet, formulates and executes concrete policy 
based on the fundamental principles of the Communist Party and its instructions. As mentioned 
previously, Wen Jiabao, Premier and Party Secretary of the State Council, is responsible for routine 
procedures regarding international monetary and currency policy. In addition, Huang Ju (Executive 
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Vice Premier) and Zhou Xiaochuan, (Governor of the People’s Bank of China) participate in the 
State Council. Although his ranking in the Communist Party is not high, Zhou Xiaochuan is well 
trusted by Wen Jiabao and attends the Standing Committee of China’s People’s Congress (equivalent 
to Cabinet meetings in Japan) despite his not being an official member. Executive members of the 
State Council are basically Communist Party members and the State Council and the Communist 
Party are virtually a single entity (Ohnishi, 2004: 9-14).
Concrete details of the Chinese international monetary and currency policy planning process 
are as follows. First, the Vice Premier of the State Council and the members in charge in the 
State Council conduct hearings to (1) receive reports on economic situations from the central 
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government ministries (such as the National Development and Reform Commission, the People’s 
Bank of China, and the Ministry of Finance) and a group of scholars with strong influence on 
policymaking in the State of Council, and (2) to draw up lists of issues in international monetary 
and currency policy. Then, the Vice Premier in charge submits the international monetary and 
currency policy agenda to the Premier of the State Council. The Premier alone conducts a further 
round of hearings, receiving reports regarding agenda setting from related departments and 
scholars. Based on the findings of the hearings the State Council makes the final decisions.
Since international monetary and currency policy work requires great expertise, the Premier 
is responsible for carrying out routine practices in coordination with the departments in charge. 
However, important issues require consultation with the Party and decisions are made and 
submitted under the names of both the Party and the State Council (Tanaka, 2007: 465-9).
In China, the role of scholars and experts is not limited to offering opinions to the State 
Council. When the Communist Party and the State Council formulate new policy, scholars and 
experts announce those policies to the people of China and to the world in the form of papers and 
research outcomes submitted to academic journals and the mass media. Regarding matters such 
as finance, currency exchange and international trade, it is thought that experts including Wu 
Jinglian, Hu Angang (professor at Tsinghua University) and Yu Yongding have extensive influence 
(Kwan, 2007).
The central government ministries are organizations which execute policy according to the 
decisions of the State Council. The National Development and Reform Commission, the People’s 
Bank of China, and the Ministry of Finance are all involved in international monetary and currency 
policy. It is important to note that the central government ministries do not formulate policy: in 
that regard China's ministries are different from Japan’s central government ministries (Onishi, 
2004: 2-35).
Ⅱ.2 Core Executive of Japan
This chapter examines the core executive of Japan. The foremost of the Japanese government 
ministries related to international finance policy is MOF. International monetary and currency 
policy work begins with ‘agenda setting’ in the section in charge of MOF International Bureau. That 
section in charge gathers a wide range of information and opinions on policy from external experts 
through the International Bureau’s Council on Customs, Tariff, Foreign Exchange and Other 
Transactions. The concrete policymaking process in the Council begins with agenda setting at 
the level of the section in charge in the International Bureau, which serves as the secretariat. The 
section collects information on international finance and the exchange market from officials who 
are temporarily transferred to international organisations (including United Nation organisations, 
the World Bank and IMF) and from finance bureaucrats working at various Japanese embassies, 
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and summarises that information into an agenda for the Council. Deliberations in the Council 
centre around the agenda as explained by the secretariat and the results of question and answer 
sessions and exchanges of opinions with invited Council members (scholars who are experts on 
international monetary and currency, and executives from the financial industry). Sometimes the 
secretariat holds hearing, inviting experts who possess detailed information and knowledge on 
specific issues. After numerous repetitions of such processes, the secretariat creates an interim 
report or the final report as a draft plan for policy, and submits it to MOF.3）
The resulting policy is then adjusted within the Ministry. The International Bureau section in 
charge of the matter gains bottom-up agreement on the policy draft based on the final report of 
the Council, under the orders of the Director of Co-ordination Division of the International Bureau, 
the Senior Deputy Director General of the International Bureau, the Director General of the 
International Bureau, the Deputy Vice Minister, and the Vice Minister of Finance for International 
Affairs. It used to be necessary to coordinate with domestic financial bureaus such as the Banking 
Bureau and the Securities Bureaus during this process; however, this has not been required since 
the Financial Services Agency (FSA) was established in 1998 to separate the domestic financial 
bureaus from the Ministry of Finance (Amyx, 2004).
The function of the FSA is to inspect and supervise the domestic financial market, so the 
Agency has close relations with Japanese and foreign financial institutions which participate in 
the international financial market. However, the Agency is not directly involved in the formulation 
of international monetary policy. Rather, since the establishment of the Agency, the domestic 
financial authorities’ influence (which is in line with the intentions of the financial institutions) 
over international monetary policymaking became weaker (Amyx, 2004). That weakening is 
thought to be strongly connected to the fact that from 1998 (the year of the establishment of the 
Financial Services Agency) onward, the International Bureau of MOF has proactively promoted the 
internationalisation of the yen.
Another government institution related to international monetary and currency policymaking 
is the Bank of Japan (BOJ). The major task of the BOJ is to stabilise prices by adjusting the official 
interest rate (Mabuchi, 1994). Since the beginning of the 21st Century, the BOJ has executed 
quantitative easing policy, directly enlarging the yen supply. This policy has a strong influence on 
the value of the yen. Since the amendment of the Bank of Japan Act in 1998, the BOJ has been 
independent from the government and MOF. This is significantly different from the system in 
China, where the People’s Bank of China is part of the central government ministries. However, in 
fact the BOJ has come to receive more pressure from the Cabinet and the ruling party than during 
the time when the Bank, under the de facto control of MOF, controlled the official interest rate, so 
as a result, quantitative easing policy was executed (Karube, 2004).
Political parties play an important role in Japan’s policymaking process. From 1955 to August 
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2009 (except for some 11 months during that period) the reign of the government centred around 
the LDP. This long reign led to an extremely close relationship between the LDP and the bureaucracy 
and engendered ‘zoku-giin (political tribes)’ strongly connected to specific ministries and deeply 
familiar with specific policy fields so as to conduct influence peddling in their constituencies and 
among their supporters (Sato and Matsuzaki, 1986). In the policymaking process during the LDP 
reign, zoku-giin examination of the ruling party’s preliminary review in the LDP Policy Research 
Council Policy Division was necessary prior to the government ministries’ submission of policy to 
the Cabinet. However, it is noteworthy that international monetary and currency policy did not 
require review within the LDP.4） Of course there were Zaimu-zoku-giin (politicians specializing in 
finance) within the LDP.5） Nevertheless, these Zaimu-zoku, despite their strong influence within 
MOF, were interested only in financial administration and showed no interest in monetary policy 
(Rosenbluth, 1989).
Consequently, international monetary and currency policy examined within MOF is submitted 
to the Cabinet without any pressure from ruling party zoku-giin or the business world, and is 
decided as official government policy. The key figures involved in international monetary and 
currency policymaking within the Cabinet are the Prime Minister, the Chief Cabinet Secretary, 
the Minister of Finance and the Minister in Charge of Financial Affairs in the Cabinet office. The 
Prime Minister and the bureaucrats exert little political will, usually only confirming policy decided 
by the Prime Minister or MOF. Until 2009, the Council on Fiscal and Economic Policy generated 
such policy during the LDP rein, and economists, experts and finance-related cabinet members 
(Chief Cabinet Secretary, Minister of Finance, Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry, Minister 
of Internal Affairs and Communication, and Minister in Charge of Financial Affairs) discussed 
economic and fiscal policy but hardly touched on international monetary and currency policy.6）
On the other hand, the desires of export-manufacturing industries such as the motor, steel, 
and machinery industries are directly conveyed via the ruling political party as pressure on the 
Prime Minister and/or cabinet members. Thus, contradictory policy was adopted to the extent 
that the internationalisation of the yen, examined by MOF, was approved in the cabinet without 
question, and at the same time, the cabinet instructed MOF to take exchange intervention 
measures to protect export industries. However, there was no mechanism in the Cabinet for the 
coordination of these two policies (Saito, 2006).
Ⅱ.3 Structural Comparison of Japanese and Chinese Core Executives
This chapter compares the core executive structures of Japan and China, beginning with a 
comparison of the political parties in the two countries. In China, the Communist Party has the 
final word on all policy decisions; in contrast, Japanese political parties have no final say in policy 
decisions. 
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The cabinet in China is called the State Council. The executives of the State Council are high 
ranking executives of the Communist Party and the State Council, unified with the central body of 
the Communist Party, gives instructions on agenda setting, policy proposals and policy execution. 
The Japanese Cabinet has the final say on policy decisions. However, regarding international 
finance, the Cabinet only approves the decisions of the Ministry of Finance, and hardly ever does 
any independent decision-making. On the other hand, regarding domestic policy, the Cabinet 
receives direct pressure from the LDP and the business world. Although domestic policy is in direct 
opposition to the internationalisation of the yen, the Cabinet is not involved in overall coordination. 
The central government ministries in China are merely organisations for the execution of the 
decisions of the State Council. In Japan, ministries such as MOF make important decisions and 
execute them. In sum, Japanese decision-making regarding international financial policy is done 
in a bottom-up manner centred around the Ministry of Finance, while in China decision-making is 
top-down, managed by the political leadership of the Communist Party and the State Council.
Ⅲ．Internationalisation of the Yen and the Yuan
This chapter reviews 1) Japan’s approach to the internationalisation of the yen, which has been 
an international transaction currency since the 1980’s; 2) the move towards the internationalisation 
of the yuan, which has recently emerged with great force; and 3) the relations underlying the 
monetary cooperation within the Asian region, which is currently manifesting a strong presence, 
and comparatively verifies those items using core executive theory.
Ⅲ.1 Japan’s Approach to the Internationalisation of the Yen
Japan’s MOF has been attempting for some 20 years to promote the internationalisation of 
the yen, under which the yen would be used widely as a settlement currency. However, as of 
2010, that attempt has not been successful. To understand why the internationalisation of the 
yen has not been successfully promoted, it is necessary to consider the ‘double standard’ of the 
Japanese government’s international monetary and currency policy. The government’s strategy 
for the internationalisation of the yen is led by MOF, yet that very same government intervenes in 
exchange rates to protect Japan's export industry by avoiding a rise in the value of the yen, which 
policy is diametrically opposed to that of internationalising the yen.
Ⅲ.1.1. Beginning of the Internationalisation of the Yen
The internationalisation of the yen began as a result of pressure from the U.S. In the first half 
of the 1980’s, Japan’s trade surplus with the U.S. increased, and the American industrial world 
criticised the U.S. government for not taking effective measures against trade deficit with Japan. 
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The American industrial world demanded that the trade be corrected by steering the exchange 
rates to weaken the dollar against the yen. In November 1983, the establishment of Japan-U.S. 
Yen-Dollar Committee was decided in the summit meeting between American president Ronald 
Reagan and Japanese prime minister Yasuhiro Nakasone. Through that committee, the U.S. 
encouraged Japan to engage in financial deregulation and internationalisation in order to achieve 
a weakening of the dollar against the yen. This reflects the thinking that when the yen is widely 
used internationally, the demand for the yen will rise and the yen exchange rate will increase. 
Subsequently Japan’s imports would expand and Japan’s trade surplus with the U.S. would be held 
down (Imamatsu, 2000).
The review for the internationalisation of the yen was triggered by this Japan-U.S. Yen-Dollar 
Committee, and the Council on Customs, Tariff, Foreign Exchange and Other Transactions, which 
was a council within the then International Finance Bureau of MOF.7） The Council presented a 
report entitled, ‘About the internationalisation of the yen’ in 1985. However, the internationalisation 
of the yen was not a pressing issue for the Japanese. Japan’s export industry, import industry 
and money industry were not saying that the internationalisation of the yen was essential. If the 
internationalisation of the yen were promoted, it was thought that it should proceed step by step in 
Japan (Imamatsu, 2010: 104).
Ⅲ.1.2 Setback of the Internationalisation of the Yen in the Midst of Economic Peak Time
From the 1980’s to the early 1990’s Japan boasted that it was in its prime time, having a bubble 
economy. On December 28, 1989, the Nikkei Stock Average reached almost 40,000 yen and the 
aggregate market price of the Tokyo market became number one in the world. As the presence 
of Japan in the world economy increased, expectations for the internationalisation of Japanese 
financial and capital markets rose. With increased acceptance of the securities of Japanese 
securities companies and affiliates of Japanese banks in overseas markets, and with active trades 
with Japanese money overseas, by the end of 1980’s it was thought that Tokyo had become one of 
the world top three financial markets, on par with London and New York (Imamatsu, 2000).
It was thought that the yen would become a key world currency along with US dollars and 
Deutsche marks. In September 1985, a meeting of the central bank governor and financial ministers 
from five major industrial countries was held; this meeting agreed to depreciate the U.S. dollar. 
With this ‘Plaza Accord’ as a trigger, the yen exchange rate rose sharply, from 1 dollar: 240 yen 
to 1 dollar: 120 in the end of 1987 (Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 2001). During that period, Japanese 
economic performance was good and it was favourable chance for the internationalisation of the 
yen, utilising the high value of the yen.
However, the yen appreciation phobia was dominating the mood in Japan’s political, 
bureaucratic and economic spheres. There was a stereotypical notion that the appreciation of 
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the yen would be an obstruction to the achievement of high economic growth. In particular, 
LDP executive members repeatedly put pressure on the financial authorities to correct the yen 
appreciation (Nihon Keizai shimbun, 2001). In addition, in those days, the laws, regulations, 
and systems necessary for enhancing the yen's function as an international currency in both trade 
transactions and capital transactions were not developed. There was a need for drastic reform of 
the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law, a review of trade practice obstacles to non-
residents, and upgrading of the short-term money market. However, there was strong resistance 
from domestic financial industries, the Bank of Japan and the Domestic Financial Bureau of MOF, 
which reacted to the intention of the domestic financial industries. Therefore the government and 
the International Financial Bureau of MOF had no choice but executing innovative deregulation of 
finance and easing of regulations (Imamatsu, 2000).
The internationalisation of the yen in the 1980’s was not proactively promoted by the financial 
authorities such as Japanese politicians and MOF. The internationalisation of the yen was promoted 
passively in opposition to the pressure for liberalisation of the market, as demanded by the U.S.A. 
Thus, the internationalisation of the yen was conducted very cautiously, so as not to influence the 
domestic industries and economy.
Ⅲ.1.3 ‘The Lost Decade’
In the first half of the 1990’s, after the bubble economy collapsed, MOF and the Bank of Japan 
had no alternative but to concentrate on measures to boost the economy, to lift stock prices in the 
market, and to eliminate bad loans. The internationalisation of the yen was not an urgent issue 
and thus was postponed. In 1995 the yen rose suddenly, the rate reaching 79 yen to the dollar 
at one point. The Japanese government responded with the usual urgent measures towards the 
appreciation of the yen, but could not come up with a concept to avoid exchange risks related to 
holding the yen overseas and using it as trading currency. Likewise, the industrial arena promoted 
measures for the appreciation of the yen by purchasing materials from overseas and relocating 
factories to overseas locations where the labour cost was low, but did not take action to eliminate 
exchange risk by using the yen as the settlement currency in trade transactions (Imamatsu, 2000).
In the second half of the 1990’s, Japan finally embarked on a drastic reform of the financial 
system.  The Banking Sector from MOF was partitioned to establish the Financial Services Agency. 
The Bank of Japan Law was revised and the BOJ's independence in terms of monetary policy was 
secured. The drastic revision of the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law, which had 
long been a concern, was realised. In November 1996, the ‘Japanese Big Bang’ was pushed through 
by then Prime Minister Hashimoto’s instructions related to monetary system reform. Aimed at 
liberalization and easing of regulations so as to enhance Tokyo’s international monetary function, 
the Big Bang's objective was to make the Tokyo market an international monetary market on par 
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with New York and London.
As a result of various approaches to monetary system reforms in the 1990’s, Japan could 
systematically prepare the necessary foundation for the internationalisation of the yen (Imamatsu, 
2000). However, internationalisation was not achieved, because the position of the yen as an 
international currency was weakened by the decline of the Japanese economy, referred to as ‘the 
lost 10 years’, and the monetary system crisis.
Ⅲ.1.4 Promotion of the Internationalisation of the Yen after the Asian Currency Crisis
The Asian currency crisis, beginning with the Thai baht crisis in the summer of 1997, 
triggered a shift in Japanese international monetary and currency policy resulting from widespread 
recognition that the cause of the currency crisis lay in the currency system, in which Asian 
countries depended excessively on the U.S. dollar (Hayami, 2005; Kuroda, 2005). This recognition 
made currency authorities centred around the International Bureau of MOF aware of the problems 
and that measures should be taken to make the yen more acceptable as an international currency, 
in the Asian region in particular.
Discussions towards the promotion of the internationalisation of the yen began including 
the Committee of Foreign Exchanges and Other Transactions, Ministry of International Trade 
and Industry (MITI) study groups and the LDP. In October 1997, MOF gathered scholars and 
experts to establish the Special Committee on Asian Monetary and Capital Market and studied the 
characteristics, causes and lessons of the financial crisis.8） At the time when the commencement of 
European Monetary Union in 1999 was decided, there was a sense of crisis that the international 
presence of the yen would be reduced, so there were animated discussions among various 
researchers and practical professionals on topics such as the internationalisation of the yen, the 
theory of the yen as a key currency, and the yen zone (Gyoten, 1996; Kondo, 2003; Onishi, 2005 and 
others).
In the meantime, MOF International Bureau9） dramatically shifted the strategy for the 
internationalisation of the yen. Until then, the internationalisation of the yen was basically seen 
as ‘Japan vs. the world.’ Concretely, the concept viewed the yen as an international currency, 
circulating globally as the settlement currency for trade transactions and capital transactions, with 
its function as foreign currency reserve enhanced. This attempt to immediately make the yen a 
key currency along with the U.S. dollar lacked reality. After the Asian currency crisis, the MOF's 
way of thinking changed, shifting to a focus on expanded usage of the yen in the Asian region and 
on the yen’s function of international currency (Kwan, 2007). As a result, the concept of the Asian 
Monetary Fund (AMF) emerged. This was a proposal that each country contribute a part of their 
foreign currency reserve to establish the AMF with funding of 100 billion dollars.
This AMF concept transformed the passive attitude of MOF International Bureau to a 
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more proactive one. The archetype of the AMF concept was seen when Japan proposed the 
establishment of the ADB in 1966, and the concept was examined within the Ministry for a 
long time. One unofficial group of MOF bureaucrats and former bureaucrats had been regularly 
discussing the formulation of the concept from the late 1980’s to 1995 (Amyx, 2002, 4-5). This 
emerged as the Japanese government’s official proposal after the Asian currency crisis. It is 
noteworthy that in the 1997 AMT conceptualisation, Japan proposed a scheme to establish a 
regional institution without the U.S.A. (Amyx, 2002), in contrast to the fact that Japan had been 
quite passive about the concept of eliminating the U.S.A. when Mahathir proposed the EAEC (East 
Asia Economic Caucus) concept. Eisuke Sakakibara, then Vice Minister of Finance for International 
Affairs, insisted that Japan should aim at stronger leadership in Asia, independent from the U.S.A. 
(Amyx, 2002: 6).
Eventually, the AMT concept broke down because the U.S.A. and other western countries 
were reluctant to adopt it, and China and Singapore opposed it (Amyx, 2002: 7). Nevertheless, 
Japan hammered out the ‘new Miyazawa Plan’ involving economic assistance measures of 30 billion 
dollars for Asian countries. Japan offered Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand 
15 billion dollars for mid-to-long term economic assistance for the recovery of real economy and 
15 billion dollars for the short term financial requirements. This could be seen as the first step 
towards the revival of the AMF concept. In MOF, a new form of leadership appeared, placing 
regional monetary cooperation in a framework which did not eliminate the U.S.A., and proactively 
approaching the reformation of IMF when Haruhiko Kuroda became Vice Minister of Finance 
for International Affairs. Japan's neighbours in Asia welcomed Japan’s stronger leadership in the 
region (Amyx, 2002: 26).
The Ministry carried forward further research on the internationalisation of the yen. 
In September 1999, The Ministry established the Study Group for the Promotion of the 
Internationalisation of the Yen, in June 2000 producing an interim report and in June 2001 
framing five measures for the promotion of the internationalisation of the yen.10） The Ministry also 
conducted research on the promotion of the yen’s Asianisation by developing the notion of the 
Asian Currency Unit (ACU). Under the Ministry, Japanese scholars carried out research on the 
creation of the ACU.11） In particular, some researchers proposed a process of evolution from Asian 
monetary cooperation to a monetary union (Kwan, 2007: Murase, 2000).
MOF International Bureau took leadership to promote currency and finance cooperation 
in Asia. First, in May 2000, the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI) was launched under the currency-
swap agreement between two countries designated in the meeting of ASEAN Plus Three Finance 
Ministers. This was an agreement to accommodate their own currency or U.S. dollar parity at a 
time of monetary crisis. As of January 2009, eight countries had joined, involving16 currency-swaps 
totaling 90 billion U.S. dollars.12）
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In the ASEAN + 3 in May 2009, CMI’s multilateralisation was agreed upon. A number of CMI 
bilateral agreements were unified into one multilateral agreement. Japan was proactively involved 
in the creation and development of CMI’s multilateral system. The current total is 120 billion 
U.S. dollars, with shares of Japan and China at 32% each, Korea 16%, and ASEAN 20%. The fact 
that the ratios of Japan and China are the same shows that each country recognized the other’s 
position and influence in regional monetary and finance cooperation. It also indicates that Japan’s 
effort to upgrade the yen’s influence in the regional economy under new historical conditions 
was recognized by the countries of East Asia, including China. MOF International Bureau showed 
leadership in approaches to the cultivation of the Asian bond market, in forms such as ABMI (Asian 
Bond Markets Initiative) and ABF (Asian Bond Fund). The outstanding issues of the Asian bond 
market increased to 3 trillion U.S. dollars by the end of 2007. In the ASEAN + 3 meeting held in 
May 2009, the Credit Guarantee and Investment Mechanism (CGIM) was created, using 500 million 
yen to guarantee bonds issued by companies in Asia (Shimizu, 2009). 
Moreover, in Asian Development Bank (ADB) where a number of Japan’s Ministry of Finance 
personnel had been sent, the Asian Currency Unit (ACU) was developed as a scale to indicate 
the weighted average efficiency of Asian currencies (of 10 ASEAN countries, Japan, China and 
Korea). In Asia, currency conflicts tend to occur because the yen and the baht, whose value rises 
in counterpoint to the decline of the dollar, and the yuan, whose value declines due to pegging to 
the dollar exchange rate, coexist. Thus, in order to maintain the balance of currencies, the increase 
and decrease of the interest rate are managed in reaction to the divergence indicator, with ACU 
calculated using the currency basket approach. The participant countries monitor each other to 
avoid currency devaluation in specific countries. It also aims at the reduction of exchange risk in 
trade in the region, as well as stabilisation of the rate.
After the Asian financial crisis in 1997 and 1998, Japan conducted various discussions on the 
internationalisation of the yen, centred around MOF International Bureau. The internationalisation 
of the yen requires liberalisation of the domestic monetary system and easing of regulations; 
these were achieved in the Financial Big Bang in the late 1990’s, although it took a long time to 
resolve conflicts within MOF, the Bank of Japan and among industries. As a result, Japan has been 
contributing to the construction of the Asian currency cooperation system in forms such as the 
Miyazawa Plan, the Chiang Mai Initiative, the creation of Asian bond markets, and the promotion of 
ACU.
Ⅲ.1.5 Japan’s Double Standard in International Monetary and Currency Policy
As seen above, a base has been prepared for the expansion of yen distribution in Asian region. 
On the other hand Japanese policy to prevent the appreciation of the yen by currency authorities’ 
intervention in the exchange rate has also taken root. From the end of WWW II to the present, 
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the Japanese government, the Bank of Japan and the industrial world have been thinking that the 
appreciation of the yen is inadvisable (Imamatsu, 2010, 95). Thus there is a contradiction in Japan's 
creating exchange policy to prevent the appreciation of the yen while at the same time attempting 
to internationalise the yen by raising its value.
In particular, at the beginning of the 2000’s, the Japanese government demanded that the 
Bank of Japan adopt the strategy of moving from zero-interest policy to quantitative easing policy. 
Between 2003 and 2004, MOF undertook intervention totaling approximately 3.4 trillion yen 
through yen selling and dollar buying in merely one year time (Suda, 2005). As a result of monetary 
policy measures against deflation, the yen became excessively abundant in the market.
The fact that the policy of preventing the yen's appreciation by means of government 
intervention in the exchange rate had taken root created the expectation in the industrial world 
that if the exchange market moved towards appreciation of the yen, MOF or the Bank of Japan 
would immediately prevent such a move (Suda, 2005). The Japanese industrial world has been 
putting pressure on party politicians to continue the yen depreciation policy so as to protect 
export industries. That in turn placed pressure on MOF and the Bank of Japan through powerful 
politicians of the ruling party, so Japan had to continue the policy of preventing the appreciation 
of its own currency. As a result, the yen's value as an international currency declined, and the 
yen denominated rate in trade transactions did not rise. Subsequently the yen became the best 
currency for const of funds in the world, so the yen-carry trade was very lively (Imamatsu, 2010). 
(The yen-carry trade involves borrowing yen and exchanging them for other currencies such as the 
U.S. dollar in order to invest in high-yield financial commodities).
Furthermore, Japan has several times hammered out economic measures in reaction to world 
financial and economic crises, starting in autumn 2008. Those measures were based on the usual 
strategy of preventing business slumps and boosting economic growth, but the internationalisation 
of the yen was not included in such packages.
During that time, in fact, the Japanese manufacturing industry was maintaining its 
competitiveness in a climate of the yen appreciation. That industry has been developing markets 
with higher profitability by developing new products with higher added value, and the export 
industry has been expanding localised production in Asia, mainly for processing and assembly. 
In theory, a strategy could be formulated to reduce export companies' exchange risk arising 
from rapid yen appreciation if the yen were used proactively in trade transactions. However, this 
thinking was not adopted in the Japanese political and economic spheres (Imamatsu, 2010).
In sum, in Japan since the Asian currency crisis in 1997 and 1998, there have been discussions 
about expansion of the use of the yen in Asia and the establishment of a new Asian currency 
system. On the other hand, Japan has been continuing its policy of not raising the yen's value, 
continuing its unprecedented intervention in yen selling and dollar buying for approximately one 
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year so as to prevent yen appreciation and dollar depreciation.
The position of the yen as an international currency has continued to weaken due to 
this double standard of simultaneously pushing two contradictory policies. As a result, the 
internationalisation of the yen has not advanced.
Ⅲ.2 Chinese Approach to the Internationalisation of the Yuan
This chapter examines the Chinese approach to the internationalisation of the yuan. In order 
to achieve the Chinese national objective of high economic growth through the promotion of 
Chinese exports, the stability of the yuan is absolute essential. In China even now, the People’s 
Bank of China does not hesitate to intervene in the exchange rate whenever it is seen as necessary. 
Although China has been increasingly assertive in the international monetary world, the intention 
is nothing more than their usual objective of securing the stability of the yuan exchange rate. 
In China the liberalisation of the domestic market and the easing of regulations are not pursued 
sufficiently to see the yuan emerging as an international currency, but experiments with the use of 
the yuan as a settlement currency in trade transactions with neighbouring countries and regions 
have been done repeatedly, with the internationalization of the yuan in mind.
Ⅲ.2.1 Exchange Rate Control for the Achievement of High Economic Growth through Export Promotion
This section begins with a review of the history of Chinese international monetary and 
currency policy up to the present day. In China, international monetary and currency strategy is 
one of the greatest concerns of political leaders. In order to achieve one of the national objectives, 
sustainable employment creation through high economic growth, it is necessary to increase exports 
by maintaining the relative stability of the yuan (Ishida, 2010). The delay in the development 
of the domestic monetary market is also one of the reasons why China is cautious about the 
internationalisation of the yuan.
For a long time China limited the drain of the yuan to foreign countries by means of exchange 
rate control and by adopting the strategy of non-internationalisation of the yuan. This was because 
China thought that the yuan’s overseas distribution would impact on the domestic monetary 
market and reduce the independence of their monetary policy. Before 1993, the Chinese financial 
authorities set low limits on the volume of yuan flow (Tanaka, 2007).
However, since 1993 the exchange rate system has gradually been reformed and the limit 
amount has been extended (Tanaka, 2007). This corresponds to the increase in overseas trade and 
human exchange promoted in Deng Xiaoping’s Chinese economic reform. In the late 1990’s and 
thereafter, the Chinese economy expanded rapidly. Utilising the merit of a cheap and abundant 
labour force, China became the factory of the world. It also became the centre of the processing 
trade by importing parts and raw materials from Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Southeast Asia, as well as 
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the western countries, and processing and assembling them in China for export. Consequently 
China is the world top producer of almost all products, including steel, colour TVs, washing 
machines, air conditioners, electric fans, radio-cassette players, bicycles, textile products, cars, and 
toys.
At the same time, criticism of China by countries such as the U.S.A. and Japan has risen in 
reaction to China's increasing of the Chinese economy's competitiveness due to the policy of 
undervaluing the yuan. In fact, Chinese trade surplus has been increasing at a pace of 60% increase 
on the previous year and an enormous volume of foreign currencies flowed into China. If those 
foreign currencies were left in the domestic market, they would be exchanged into yuan and the 
yuan appreciation would occur. However, the Chinese government attempted to prevent this by 
intervening in the market by purchasing foreign currencies. In response the U.S.A. insisted that the 
yuan should have risen by 20% on all currencies or least by 40% on the U.S. dollar (Ishida, 2010).
Gradually China shifted the currency peg system in their exchange rate policy to the managed 
float system. In July 2005 China raised the yuan by 2.1% from 8.2765 yuan to 8.11 yuan to the U.S. 
dollar. Subsequently, by September 2008 the yuan-dollar rate rose by some 20% in cumulative total 
but the increase in exports did not diminish. Zhou Xiaochuan, the governor of the People’s Bank 
of China, referred to the necessity of the correction of the U.S. dollar single-pole structure in his 
speech in February 2009. In March, in a paper on the website of the People’s Bank, Zhou Xiaochuan 
again presented his view that it is an ideal objective to reform the international currency system by 
improving the SDR (Special Drawing Rights) system of the IMF and creating reserve assets which 
are not connected to the sovereign nation (Zhow, 2009). Some have pointed out that this indicates 
that China has begun to aim at making the yuan a key currency, but actually China aims at securing 
its influence in the international community in order to stabilise the yuan exchange rate, as usual 
(Ishida, 2010).
Ⅲ.2.2 Laying a Foundation for the Internationalisation of the Yuan
While the Chinese government displays a cautious attitude regarding the internationalisation 
of the yuan, it has also undertaken research on that very topic. Prior to the financial crisis of 2008, 
Chinese researchers began proactively voicing support for the internationalisation of the yuan, 
largely as a component of national competitiveness strategy. They pointed out the necessity of an 
international currency other than the U.S. dollar, and insisted that the Chinese economy would be 
stronger after the financial crisis and thus the yuan would be an ideal international currencies (Ba 
Shusong, 2004 and other). 
Scholars such as Yi Gang, Zhang Ming and Hai-Hong Gao, recognizing that if China became 
an economic power after reaching a certain stage of development, the final form of competition 
with other countries would be a currency competition, have been discussing some concrete 
－ 286 －
政策科学　19 － 3，Mar. 2012
strategies for the internationalisation of the yuan. Their first thought was that the benefits of 
internationalising the yuan would be to support the diversification of the international currency 
system, to restrain the current heavy use of the U.S. dollar and to bring stability of the world 
economy. Their proposals are as follows: any attempt to challenge to U.S. dollar by direct 
internationalisation of the yuan without the promotion of regional cooperation in currency and 
finance carries a risk of failure, so utilizing the current Chinese trade structure, they should make 
the yuan a major settlement currency in neighboring countries which are culturally similar to China 
and have strong economic and trade relationships with China. Then marginalisation would be 
promoted, as the yuan would be those countries’ reserve currency. Subsequently the yuan would 
be the currency in common free circulation in the Great China Sphere that integrates China, Hong 
Kong, Macao, and Taiwan. This proposal constitutes a gradual approach to the internationalisation 
of the yuan (Onishi, 2005).
The marginalisation of the yuan has actually proceeded spontaneously in the private sector. In 
the countries and regions neighbouring China, the yuan has come into use as a settlement currency. 
In that light, in December 2008 the Chinese government decided to begin a test, using the yuan 
for trade settlement among China, certain regions of China, and certain neighbouring countries 
and regions. At a State Council executive meeting Premier Wen Jiabao ordered the trial use of the 
yuan as a settlement currency for Guangdong’s trade with Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan, and for 
Guangxi and Yunnan's trade with ASEAN countries. The Council decided to further test yuan as a 
trade settlement currency in Shanghai, Guangzhou, Shenzhen, Zhuhai and Dongguan. Moreover, 
from December 2008 to April 2009, China successively made currency-swapping agreements with 
Korea, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Indonesia and Argentina, totalling 650 million yuan, and subsequently 
the yuan spread across Asia (Ishida, 2010). Thus China has begun experimentation towards the 
future internationalisation of the yuan. 
Ⅳ．Analysis: Comparison of Japanese and Chinese International Monetary Policy Processes
This final chapter compares international monetary and currency policy planning processes 
in Japan and in China. At a glance, there appears to be a significant difference between Japanese 
and Chinese policies. However, both countries are dependent on the U.S.A. in trade structure 
and both have a high ratio of dollar based transactions for currency trading. As well, Japan and 
China are similar in terms of their approaches to advancement of export industry, due to exchange 
stabilisation against the U.S. dollar. Thus in both countries, the currency authorities have been 
responding to the appreciation of currency value with an attitude of readiness to intervene in the 
exchange rate. 
In this regard, however, the leaders of the Communist Party and the State Council in China 
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have been showing strong political will to stabilise the exchange rate. For example, on the 
occasion of the 2008 financial crisis, Zhou Xiaochuan, the Governor of the People’s Bank of China, 
insisted on international currency strategy such as reforming the international currency system 
and utilizing SDR to stabilise the yuan exchange rate by strengthening Chinese influence in the 
international financial community. On the other hand, neither the Japanese Prime Minister nor the 
Minister of Finance made any similarly strong assertion. In the same year, 2008, during the financial 
crisis, Prime Minister Aso merely mentioned the continuation of the U.S. dollar as the key currency, 
which was the status quo.
Both Japan and China aspired to reduce the risk of U.S. dollar dependence by 
internationalising their currency. In the case of Japan, the environment for the internationalisation 
of the yen has been created through reviews, mainly among MOF International Bureau and scholars 
and leading currency cooperation with countries in Asia. However, the Cabinet (the Prime Minister 
and Minister of Finance) did not display leadership regarding the internationalisation of the yen. 
They left exchange rate policy, which requires high expertise, to MOF and the BOJ. In addition, 
since the Cabinet has been under constant pressure from export industries and political parties' 
zoku-giin, who respond to the urging of export industries, they did not have will to alter policy on 
the depreciation of the yen, a factor which protects export industries.
In China, on the other hand, the Communist Party and the State Council work directly on 
the formulation of international monetary and currency policy. They also express explicit political 
intentions about the internationalisation of the yuan based on their collection of knowledge and 
information from scholars. Further, they have begun to experiment with use of the yuan as a 
settlement currency with neighbouring countries, although they set stabilisation of the yuan 
exchange rate as the most important issue. 
Core executive theory can be applied to an examination of the reasons for such international 
monetary and currency policy differences between Japan and China. Japan has a bottom-up 
policymaking system in which first MOF collects information and expertise from the business world 
and academia. The Cabinet has the authority to make final decisions on policy proposals received 
from MOF. However, in reality, the Cabinet does not have any articulate political intentions, and 
leaves such matters to MOF. It is difficult to make such political decisions in the absence of well-
defined intentions.
China has a top-down policymaking system. The government displays its intentions clearly 
throughout the country and overseas. In addition, the Communist Party and the State Council are 
never influenced by the business world.
In conclusion, the reason why Japan cannot display political leadership in international 
monetary and currency policy lies in the fact that in the core executive structure the Cabinet 
merely acquiesces to policy formulated through a bottom-up process and is easily controlled by 
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pressure from the business world and political parties. For Japan to pursue the internationalisation 
of the yen, to hammer out clear intentions in the international financial community, and to enhance 
its influence, the Cabinet must be distanced from the influence of the business world and political 
parties and must play a substantial role in the actual formation of international monetary and 
currency policy.
Note
1）The internationalisation of a currency is achieved by increasing the rate of use of that currency in 
international financial transactions or in overseas trading or in the ratio of denominated currency [0]in non-
resident asset holdings. Concretely, internationalisation calls for an increase of the value of the currency [0]in 
the international currency system and of the weight of the currency in current transactions, capital 
transactions and foreign currency reserves (Kamikawa and Imamatsu, 1997).
2）This diagram, created by the author, is based on concepts such as those of Onishi (2004) and Murakawa 
(2000).
3）Committee on Foreign Exchange and Other Transactions: please refer to
 http://www.mof.go.jp/english/e1a018f2.htm
4）According to Koichi Kato (former LDP Secretary General and Chief Cabinet Secretary), monetary policy is 
discussed among the Ministry of Finance and a small circle of politicians formerly in the Ministry of Finance, 
including Kiichi Miyazawa. Since Kato was a politician and former foreign affairs bureaucrat, he could not 
join the circle even when he was the Secretary General. (Source: author’s interview with Kato)
5）In one sense, the LDP politicians, who all scramble for the budget share to distribute to their supporters and 
constituency, are all Zaimu-zoku-giin.
6）Proceedings of the Council on Fiscal and Economic Policy: please refer to
 http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/policy/keizai/index_e.html
7）Committee on Foreign Exchange and Other Transactions: please refer to
 http://www.mof.go.jp/english/e1a018f2.htm
8）Committee on Foreign Exchange and Other Transactions: please refer to
 http://www.mof.go.jp/english/e1a018f2.htm
9）MOF was reorganised in January 2001 and the International Finance Bureau was renamed the International 
Bureau.
10） This report included topics such as
 1) Increase in domestic demand and yen denominated import transactions;
 2)  Improvement of the environment for enhanced convenience of the yen (upgrading financial and capital 
markets and creating a market where the yen and other Asian currencies can be exchanged directly);
 3) Review of past systems and practices;
 4) Cooperation in the currency and monetary field among countries in Asia;
 5) Expansion of dialogues in the Asian region by constructing a new economic and monetary system.
 At the same time, the Study Group for the Promotion of the Internationalisation of the Yen commissioned 
the following research by the Institute for International Monetary Affairs:
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 　　a)  Foreign exchange controls in Asia and the possibility of direct transactions involving the yen and 
other Asian currencies,
 　　b) Actual conditions survey of countries which adopted the currency basket system,
 　　c) Field survey on domestic companies related to imports.
 The Institute submitted three reports in February and March 2001. The National Institute for 
Research Advancement (NIRA) submitted a report entitled ‘Collaborating and deepening currency 
policies in East Asia’ (NIRA, 2001). The Institute pointed out that it is more correct to say that 
Japan’s past monetary policy encouraged instability in the Asian economy rather than developing it.
11） Ogawa and Ito (2000) presented a working paper on the details of the Asian currency basket at the 
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER). They then conducted detailed research on the ACU concept 
built with Asian major currencies. This research used the trade share of well-balanced years as a standard for 
the composition ratio of the currency basket. Ogawa and Shimizu (2005), setting the U.S. dollar and the Euro 
in place as anchor currencies, calculated AMU with a weighted balance of 13 ASEAN + 3 countries’ 
currencies, based on these four standards: 1) trade volume, 2) nominal GDP, 3) GDP measured by 
purchasing power parity, and 4) foreign exchange reserve.
12） MOF website: http://www.mof.go.jp/english/if/CMI_0704.pdf[0]
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